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Agri-environmental conservation – the case for an environmental levy
J.Crean 
Recent  environmental  assessments  have  highlighted  the  extent  of  land  degradation  in 
Australia and the significant costs involved in addressing it. With projected investment costs 
running into tens of billions of dollars, it is not surprising that greater attention is now being 
focussed  on  who  should  pay.  One  idea  gathering  significant  momentum  has  been  the 
imposition of an environmental levy. Such a levy would raise public funds to be spent on 
resource degradation issues and has been proposed to work through the taxation system in a 
similar fashion to the Medicare levy, albeit for a more limited 10 year period. 
The  paper  assesses  the  arguments  behind  the  imposition  of  an  environmental  levy  and 
considers  some  of  the  issues  associated  with  its  effective  implementation.  Particular 
challenges in the establishment of environmental priorities, public and private attributes of 
environmental  problems  and  the  institutional  arrangements  for  levy  collection  and 
management are identified and discussed.
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1. Introduction
The use and management of natural resources has been an issue of growing concern in Australia over 
a long period of time. Rising community expectations about the management of resources has been 
underpinned by greater resource scarcity relative to demands with conflicts resulting between resource 
users.
More recent concerns about resource use have been further fuelled by increasing evidence of the 
extent  of  natural  resource  degradation  in  Australia.  Key  issues  include  soil  erosion,  soil  acidity, 
dryland salinity, loss of native vegetation and biodiversity, falling water quality and declines in the 
environmental  health  of  rivers  and  groundwater  aquifers.  The  cost  of  three  major  types  of  soil 
degradation (salinity, sodicity and acidity), have been estimated to be $2.4b annually (CRC for Soil 
and Land Management 1999).
The National Farmers Federation (NFF) and the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) recently 
commissioned  a study,  commonly known  as the  ‘Repairing  the Country’  report
1, on the scale  of 
investment required to arrest the trend of degradation. The findings suggest a total investment in the 
order of $65 billion would be required with around $37 billion being sought from the public sector
2. 
With around 65 per cent of Australia’s land mass in private hands, a large proportion of the proposed 
funding would be directed towards changing agricultural land uses and adopting more sustainable 
management practices. The use of public funds in this way is consistent with the concerns expressed
by  the  agricultural  sector  about  the  erosion  of  agricultural  property  rights  and  the  need  to  more 
equitably share the costs of agri-environmental conservation between landholders and the general 
community (so called ‘environmental equity’).
With  the  prospect  of  such  a  large  injection  of  public  funds  into  environmental  management, 
environmental and farming groups have rallied behind calls to establish a new environmental levy. 
The concept has also been welcomed by Toyne and Farley
3 (2000) in their review of the ‘Decade of 
Landcare’, the recently formed Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists
4 and is identified as an 
initiative worthy of further evaluation  in the recommendations of the Standing Committee Inquiry 
into Catchment Management. 
The need for a special purpose levy is based on an assessment that such a significant increase in the 
funding of environmental issues is outside the scope of existing government budgets and beyond the 
level of agri-environmental conservation which could reasonably be expected of landholders. It is 
proposed that the levy would operate through the general taxation system in a similar fashion to the 
Medicare levy. Toyne and Farley support a 1 per cent Landcare Tax which they estimate would raise 
around $30 billion over 10 years.
                                                
1 Virtual Consulting Group & Griffin NRM Pty Ltd (2000), ‘An Investment Scenario’, for National Farmers Federation 
and Australian Conservation Federation with the assistance of LWRRDC.
2 Other projections on the costs of fixing our environmental woes are similarly large. For example, the Commonwealth 
Treasury Secretary, Mr Ted Evans estimated the cost of repairing the Murray-Darling basin to be at least $30 billion 
(House of Representatives Catchment Management Inquiry 2000).
3 Phillip Toyne and Rick Farley formed the original strategic alliance between NFF and ACF which successfully secured 
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The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the arguments behind the calls for increased 
environmental funding. The next section of the paper provides an overview of the involvement of 
government  in  natural  resource  management.  The  two  principle  reasons  promoted  for  an 
environmental levy, the increasing costs of degradation and the need for environmental equity, are 
discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 raises some issues in considering whether an 
environmental levy is an appropriate way to raise funds for environmental priorities while the last 
section draws together some conclusions. 
2. Government involvement in NRM issues
2.1 Government responses
Long standing problems with the use of natural resources have resulted in governments taking an 
increasing  role  in  their  management.  A  large  proportion  of  government  involvement  in  natural 
resources comes from State governments because constitutional responsibility for natural resource 
management (including land and water resources and environmental protection) resides with States. 
However,  the  Commonwealth  also  has  a  significant  influence  through  its  broad  ranging 
responsibilities (international agreements on environmental issues, taxation and trade) and its direct 
involvement in funding and coordinating major national programs. Governments have attempted to 
address  resource  management  problems  through  a  range  of  policies  and  programs  which  can  be 
generally categorised as either regulatory, market based or of an information nature. 
In many instances, governments have initially adopted legislative and regulatory approaches to pursue 
environmental objectives. The Productivity Commission’s Inquiry into Ecologically Sustainable Land 
Management  noted  the  large  and  growing  volume  of  both  Commonwealth  and  State  regulation 
affecting rural land use in Australia. While regulatory approaches have had some success in meeting 
environmental  objectives,  they  can  impose  significant  costs  on  particular sectors  of  the  economy 
because of their lack of flexibility. 
At  the  other  end  of  the  policy  spectrum  lie  persuasion  and  voluntary  approaches  based  around 
improving  awareness  of  environmental  issues.  Some  of  this  can  be  seen  through  major  research 
programs  (Land  and  Water  Australia  and  MDBC)  and  community  based  programs  which  have 
education as a major element of their strategy (Landcare). 
Governments have also pursued environmental objectives through economic instruments. These are 
often categorised as either price or quantity based. Price based approaches influence environmental 
outcomes by modifying prices through charges and taxes, subsidies (eg. taxation concessions for land 
care). Quantity based instruments often involve the establishment of new rights (eg. cap and trade 
schemes). Economic instruments operate by changing private incentives to better align private and 
public interests and are being increasingly looked at by governments because of the flexibility they 
provide and the incentives they provide for ongoing innovation.
2.2 Levels of funding
An increasing amount of public and private resources is being committed to environmental issues. 
According to ABS (1998) Governments, industry and households in Australia spent an estimated $7.9 
billion in 1995-96 on measures to protect the environment, up from $6.6 billion in 1992-93. Total 
environment protection expenditure represented 1.6 per cent of GDP. The public sector accounted for 
approximately half ($3.8 billion) of total environmental protection in 1995-96 with major expenditure 
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The public funding of environmental issues has increased in recent years with Commonwealth, State 
and  local  governments  spending  billions  of  dollars  on  environmental  and  natural  resource 
management programs. Some examples include:
 National  Landcare  Program  –  during  the  1990’s  (the  ‘Decade  of  Landcare’),  expenditure 
amounted to over $1 billion with a primary focus on the restoration of degraded lands;
 The Natural Heritage Trust program – involved the expenditure of $1.5 billion between 1997 
and 2002 with a further $1 billion budgeted for an extension of the program over the next 5 
years;
 The National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality – a program funded jointly by the 
States and the Commonwealth with an allocation of $1.4 billion over the next 5 years. 
In addition to these major programs, all levels of government make significant contributions in the 
form of ongoing environmental programs and initiatives. For example, ABS (2000) estimate that local 
government alone contributed $3.5 billion on environment related activities in 1998-99.
3. Economic  efficiency  aspects  -  the  significance  of  environmental 
problems
3.1 Lomborg’s litany
Bjorn Lomborg’s well publicised book The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of 
the World, has attracted widespread debate on the significance of environmental problems. A key 
theme  within  the  book  is  what  Lomborg  describes  as  the  ‘litany  of  our  ever  deteriorating 
environment’.  He  suggests  that  our  understanding  of  the  real  state  of  the  environment  has  been 
massively skewed by environmental advocates and scientists to the extent that we seldom question 
exaggerated claims of environmental degradation and impending disasters. Lomborg writes:
This understanding of the environment is all pervasive. We are all familiar with the litany: the 
environment is in poor shape, our resources are running out; the population is ever growing, leaving 
less to eat; the air and water are becoming more polluted; the planets species are becoming extinct 
in vast numbers …. We know the litany and have heard it so often that yet another repetition is, well, 
almost reassuring. There is just one problem: it does not seem to be backed up by the available 
evidence (p 4).
The extent of any such litany in respect to environmental issues in Australia is significant as the 
perception of problems ultimately drives decisions in the political arena. In the light of Lomborg’s 
observations, it may be desirable to review general perceptions of the significance of degradation 
against evidence of the extent of degradation in Australia. Certainly, there appears to be no shortage of 
claims about an impending crisis in the state of our natural resources in Australia. Evidence of these 
views  can  be  readily  found  in  publications  across  environmental  lobby  groups,  environmental 
scientists and politicians alike. The following serve as examples:
For years ACF has been warning that Australia is losing the battle to save our rivers, soils, species 
and  natural  places,  that  salinity  is  getting  out  of  control,  and  the  cost  of  this  environmental 
degradation – now and into the future – is unacceptable (ACF 2001).Agri-environmental conservation – the case for an environmental levy 4
Our land management practices over the past 200 years have left a landscape in which freshwater rivers 
are choking with sand, where topsoil is being blown into the Tasman Sea, where salt is destroying rivers 
and land like a cancer, and where many of our native plants and animals are heading for extinction 
(Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists 2002).
There is little doubt that Australia faces an environmental crisis. There is also little doubt that the 
consequences  of  failing  to  act  in  an  appropriate  way  will  be  crippling  to  our  society  and  our 
economy (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage. 2001).
Australian scorecard
The most recent and comprehensive data on the extent of degradation in Australia is available through 
the National Land and Water Resources Audit (NLWRA)
5. Whilst there are deficiencies in terms of 
trend data, the comprehensive nature of the NLWRA should provide a much better basis for making 
decisions about environmental priorities in the future. Importantly, it provides a more independent and 
less emotive account of the state of the environment than that reflected in the statements given above. 
Current findings suggest a mixture of good and bad news:
- Australia’s agricultural landscapes have doubled in biological productivity since European 
settlement;
- Cropping systems have delivered substantial gains in productivity;
- Riverbank erosion is widespread in agricultural landscapes;
- Salinity will continue to degrade rural and urban landscapes;
- Soil erosion and in-stream turbidity are clearly major issues for eastern Australia;
- Nearly  half  of  Australia’s  subregions  are  in  excellent  environmental  health,  presenting 
opportunities for protective management (NLWRA 2002, A program of the Natural Heritage 
Trust, ‘Australia’s Natural Resources 1997 – 2002 and beyond’).
The implication of these findings is that we should be sceptical of rhetoric which suggest that trends in 
the state of natural resources are all bad or that the environment is ‘going down the gurgler’. This is 
not to say that the current state of natural resources is acceptable to the community. However, it does 
suggest  we  should  avoid  placing  too  much  emphasis  on  broad  statements  about  the  state  of  the 
environment. From a public policy perspective, the acceptance of an overwhelmingly pessimistic view 
of the state of the environment is likely to divert the allocation of resources from other areas of the 
economy and trigger a range of possibly inappropriate policy responses. 
A tendency to over exaggerate the extent of problems is not an issue confined to the environmental 
sector. The general public and special interest groups make claims about the significance of problems 
and  hence  the  inadequacy  of  resourcing  across  most  areas  of  government  involvement.  What 
differentiates the environmental issue is the bipartisan concern and strength of feeling that people have 
on the issue. Lomborg argues:
In the same way as you can only be for peace and freedom and against hunger and destruction, it is 
impossible to be anything but for the environment. But this has given the environment debate a 
peculiar status. Over the past few decades there has been an increasing fusion of truth and good 
intentions in the environmental debate. Not only are we familiar with the litany, and know it to be 
true. We also know that anyone who claims anything else must have disturbingly evil intentions (pg 
32).
                                                
5 This is a Commonwealth Government program funded over five years to provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
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The potential biases in information presented to us on the environment stress the importance of having 
good information about the state of the environment and trying to be objective in assessing policy 
options.  There  should  be  little  argument  from  economists  on  this  point.  Lomborg  stresses  the 
importance of not placing too much confidence on the views of environmental lobbyists and suggests 
that we should ‘strive for a careful democratic check on the environmental debate, by knowing the 
real state of the world – having knowledge of the most important facts and connections in the essential 
areas of our world’. 
Despite having good processes in place for the reporting of the state of natural resources, some care 
needs  to  be  taken  in  the  communication  of  key  messages.  For  example,  the  2001  State  of  the 
Environment Report refers to problems with land clearing by stating that ‘the rate of land clearance 
has accelerated, with as much cleared during the last 50 years as in the 150 years before’ (ASEC 2001, 
pg 7). Information from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) on clearing rates is given in Table 
1.
Table 1: Native vegetation clearance rates
6
Period Average annual clearance rate (ha)
1971 to 1980 1,465,153
1981 to 1990 550,567
1991 to 1999 380,897
The statement within the report is not incorrect but it conveys a misleading picture that clearing rates 
are increasing whereas rates have actually fallen in each 10-year period over the last 30 years. This is 
not to say that the current rate of clearing is acceptable or desirable, but it does illustrate a long term 
downward trend not an upward trend. 
The importance of having accurate information on the state of the environment is important because 
funding decisions can become highly politicised. This political aspect can be seen in the writings of 
Toyne and Farley (2000) in their review of Landcare when they suggest that ‘there is a political 
imperative to maximise the number of projects funded across the country so that as many voters as 
possible can see where their Telstra dollars have gone’ (cited in Edwards and Byron 2001). The ambit 
nature of claims for environmental funding are also evident in the preface to Toyne and Farleys report 
written by Clive Hamilton of the Australian Institute. Reference is made to the meeting held between 
the Prime Minister, Farley and Toyne in 1989 which approved $340 million of Landcare funding over 
10 years. Farley is quoted as saying immediately after the meeting; ‘Damn, I knew we should have 
asked for a billion’. 
3.2 Is degradation an economic problem ?
Some economic reasons for degradation
The economic causes of degradation are well documented (see Industry Commission 1998, Chisholm 
1987, Kirby and Blythe 1987). A central theme lies in the characteristics of natural resources which 
results in them being more susceptible to misuse through the existence of market failure. Private 
markets can fail to allocate environmental resources efficiently because such resources often exhibit 
the characteristics of non-rivalry and/or non-excludability. Non-rivalry refers to a situation where one 
                                                
6 ABS (2002). ‘Year Book Australia 2002 - Australia's land resources - an overview’. The ABS broke down the 1991-99 
period into two periods of 1991-95 and 1996-99. The clearance rates for these periods were 337,350 and 424,444 ha, 
respectively which suggest an increasing trend. The data have been aggregated to be consistent with the timescale of other 
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person’s use of a good does not diminish another’s, while non-excludability means that the use of the 
resource by others cannot be prevented. 
These characteristics can lead to situations where decision makers do not experience the full costs or 
benefits of their actions, indicating a divergence between private and social outcomes (externalities). 
The same characteristics can also lead to the exclusion of public benefits (such as environmental 
amenity or the preservation of biodiversity) in private decisions because such values are not captured 
within  conventional  markets.  In  these  circumstances,  landholders  are  likely  to  underinvest  in 
conservation activities because they are unable to fully capture the benefits. 
Market failure can also arise from information problems. Often there is considerable uncertainty about 
the links between particular practices and land and water degradation. Poor information also acts as a 
barrier to landholders in ameliorating degradation and constrains the development and implementation 
of  policies  to  prevent  future  land  degradation.  All  of  these  problems  suggest  that  the  unrestricted 
operation  of  free  markets  can  lead  to  socially  unacceptable  outcomes  associated  with  the  use  of 
natural resources. The sources of market failure identified above provide a basic economic rationale 
for corrective government involvement
7.
Government policies themselves have also been identified as contributors to the degradation of natural 
resources. Common examples cited include taxation incentives for land clearing, resource pricing 
subsidies  (eg  water  pricing),  input  subsidies  (eg  fertiliser  subsidies  leading  to  increased  soil 
acidification), agricultural price supports and drought policies
8. With the exception of the latter, many 
of these arrangements have either been removed or their effects reduced through a process of policy 
reform. 
Extent and costs of degradation
The nature and extent of land degradation has been a key issue for scientists and economists for some 
time.  Indeed,  Chisholm  and  Dumsday  (1987)  devoted  a  whole  book  to  the  problems  of  land 
degradation and potential policies to address it some 15 years ago. More recent contributions come 
from LWRDC (1998), Industry Commission (1998), and Mullen (2001). 
The extent of land degradation in Australia is often discussed in terms of the area of land affected by 
particular problems, income lost as a result of degradation or the cost associated with repairing it. 
There are a number of estimates on the nature of these costs. One set of estimates of the extent and 
costs of degradation appear in Virtual Consulting et al (2000) and are included at Table 2. 
Whilst degradation may be broadly attributed to market failure problems, the sheer existence of any 
level  of  degradation  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  market  failures  exist.  Put  another  way,  the 
efficient level of land degradation is not necessarily zero. Most commentaries, and indeed much of the 
argument for increased public funding of environmental issues, is based on the assumption that the 
existence of land degradation is itself a sufficient condition for government intervention.
Assuming there is market failure, its form and extent notwithstanding, the next question is how can 
governments intervene to efficiently address the problem? Whilst information on the level or cost of 
degradation is important in understanding of the extent of our environmental problems (as discussed 
above), it is not sufficient for determining what we should do about them. Neither the area of resource 
                                                
7 The existence of market failure provides a necessary but not sufficient condition for government intervention given that 
such intervention is not costless and that possible regulatory failure can generate inefficiencies beyond that of the market. 
8 Some authors have noted the potential for transport subsidies to discourage de-stocking during drought periods with 
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degradation nor the estimated costs of that degradation inform us about whether the problem can be 
efficiently addressed.
Table 2: Cost estimates of land and water degradation 
Form of degradation
Estimate
 ($ million per year)
Salinity 270
Acid soils 300





Source:  Virtual  Consulting  Group  &  Griffin  NRM  Pty  Ltd  (2000),  ‘An  Investment  Scenario’,  for  National  Farmers 
Federation and Australian Conservation Federation with the assistance of LWRRDC.
Assessing  the  efficiency of  increasing  public  funding  of  environmental  issues  requires a  forward 
rather than a backward looking approach. We need to focus on the marginal social benefits from 
addressing a particular degradation problem relative to the marginal social costs. In contemplating 
such a task, we should recognise that the sum of public and private benefits from some conservation 
or environmental protection initiatives may not exceed their costs. In a similar way, we would not 
expect that a range of public infrastructure projects in other areas, no matter how well intentioned, 
represented efficient economic investments. 
We should also be aware that the nature of the benefits which might arise from the implementation of 
environmental improvements may be quite difficult to value. In these instances, a pragmatic approach 
may be to undertake a cost effectiveness analysis of options proposed to address the environmental 
issue. Similarly, given the potential for political involvement in the allocation of environmental funds, 
the economist’s  role may  be  reduced to  one  of  evaluating  how to  best  allocate  the  funds  across
conservation works rather than assessing the merits of the allocation itself. 
3.3 Returns from past and proposed environmental expenditure
Past expenditure
A pertinent issue in relation to the expenditure of additional funding for the environment is the level 
of  returns  from  existing  programs.  There  is  a  general  lack  of  independent  information  on  this 
important issue. Bardsley, Chaudri and Stoneham (2001) note that while governments have allocated 
enormous amounts of funding to environmental concerns there has been little accountability to the 
public purse on the effectiveness of policies implemented. 
Whilst there is little in terms of independent reviews, there is considerable anecdotal evidence of poor 
returns from programs like NHT and Landcare. For example, the ACF suggest that the NHT program 
has ‘squandered public money and wasted community effort by operating a poorly coordinated grants 
program rather than a strategic investment program’. Pannell notes that ‘the momentum behind ever 
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that the new money is not spent as unproductively as the old money’. There appears to be support for 
the view that NHT has resulted in a large number of small projects being funded with little overall 
effect. A further question is therefore - if we have difficulty in efficiently investing relatively scarce 
amounts of funds to environmental issues (eg less that $2 billion) then what is the probability of 
spending the proposed $37 billion in an efficient way?  
Proposed environmental expenditure
The findings of the Repairing the Country report (Virtual Consulting et al 2000) estimated that a total 
investment in the order of $65 billion would be required to address land degradation with $37 billion 
coming  from  the  public  sector.  The  potential  returns  from  environmental  expenditure  ultimately 
depend on where the funds are allocated. Table 3 summarises the allocation of funds to particular 
areas as detailed in the Repairing the Country report.  
Table 3: The management changes and investment required to meet national targets
Area of investment Scale Total ($ million)
over ten years
Public investment ($ million) 
over ten years
Salinity:
- Small-lot forestry 2.1 million 
hectares
3100 1.6 (50%)
- Plantation forestry 14.6 million 
hectares
22000 11 (50%)





- Perennial pastures 26 million hectares 4500 900 (20%)
- Fencing 2.4 million 
kilometres
5500 1.8 (33%)
- Other 2800 1.4 (50%)
Salinity subtotal 46000 24,000
Erosion and soil structure decline 2200 1.2 (55%)
Soil acidification 1200 122 (10%)
Biodiversity protection 2.4 million 
hectares
5200 4.4 (85%)
Acid sulphate soils 88 69 (78%)
Riparian zone protection 1500 718 (49%)
Land clearing controls implementation 600 600 (100%)
Rangeland retirement for biodiversity 722 722 (100%)
Environmental weed control 100 40 (40%)
Environmental flows 150 150 (100%)
Irrigation drainage control and improved 
practices
200 60 (30%)
Management of the change 1800 1.7 (93%)
Total capital investment required 60,000 34,000
Annual maintenance requirement 519 321 (62%)
The most significant feature of the allocation is the significant component of funds directed at salinity 
management ($46 out of $65 billion). Recent work on salinity suggests problems in the identification 
of profitable solutions to salinity problems because many treatments are only partially effective, slow 
to take effect and expensive (Pannell 2001). 
There also appears to be less convincing evidence about the magnitude of externalities of salinity. 
Revegetation  of  areas  of  catchments  has  also  been  demonstrated  to  have  an  adverse  effect  on 
catchment yields leading to a reduction in stream flows (Heaney, Beare and Bell 2000). Combining Agri-environmental conservation – the case for an environmental levy 9
these findings with the estimated annual agricultural costs of salinity (eg $270 million annually), 
suggests that the broader environmental benefits from salinity control (biodiversity etc) would need to 
be large for such a plan to be in the community’s interest.  
Despite some shortcomings , it should be acknowledged that the Repairing the Country report is, at 
the very least, a step in the right direction as it considers both the benefits and costs of addressing 
degradation, albeit at a scale which is too broad to be of much practical use. 
3.4 Challenges to efficient investment 
Uncertainty
Much of land degradation in Australia is geographically diffuse. Commonly, this makes degradation 
both  difficult  to  accurately  measure  and  difficult  to  assign  to  individuals.  Physical  complexities 
associated with land degradation processes, including interactions with climatic conditions, suggest 
that certainty in causes and effects is likely to be the exception rather than the norm. This poses major 
challenges  for  efficient  investment  in  addressing  existing  and  preventing  further  land  and  water 
degradation. Natural resource management problems are significantly different to many conventional 
policy  problems  due  to  temporal  and  spatial  scales,  pervasive  uncertainty,  complexity  and  cross 
problem connectivity (Dovers 2000). Many reports gloss over the significance of such uncertainties. 
For example, the Wentworth Group seems overly optimistic about the ability of technical experts to 
identify  standards  for  environmental  management  so  we  can  make  judgements  about  landholder 
responsibilities. Gleeson offers the following remarks: 
The  Wentworth  Group,  like  many  technically  deterministic  groups  and  individuals  before  it,  is 
apparently sufficiently confident in our understanding of the biophysical features of our landscapes 
to  assert  that  there  are  best  practices  that  should  be  applied  universally  within  and  across 
catchments. Land managers applying these best practices would be exempt from economic costs. 
Such approaches do not account for the heterogeneity that exists in our landscapes, they constrain 
creativity and cycles of continuous learning and they stifle innovation.(Gleeson 2003, pg 2)
Institutional arrangements
The effectiveness of institutional arrangements to address natural resource management problems has 
been identified in a series of major reviews as a key issue of concern. For example, the Industry 
Commission (1998) concluded that there were problems with current institutional arrangements in 
terms  of  the  limited  devolution  and  capacity  of  local  and  regional  institutions  to  deal  with 
environmental problems and that there was poor coordination of responsibilities amongst agencies 
involved  in  environmental  management.  There  are  also  concerns  with  the  proliferation  of 
environmental regulation across many jurisdictions. With the sheer volume of regulation governing 
land use, there would only be a limited number of landholders with a good understanding of their 
environmental  responsibilities.  Bardsley,  Chaudri  and  Stoneham  (2001)  note  that  environmental 
policies  have  suffered  common  problems  due  to  piecemeal  approaches  to  the  environmental 
landscape.  These approaches have tended to consider particular environmental issues (biodiversity, 
water quality, dryland salinity etc) in isolation. 
Potential for perverse outcomes
Some care should be taken in avoiding potential perverse outcomes from government intervention in 
resource management. For example, Chisholm (1992) has argued that subsidies aimed at conservation 
works can reduce the costs of ameliorating degradation and thus can increase the amount of land 
requiring such works, Hence, subsidies can inadvertently provide an incentive for farmers to adopt 
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4. Public funding - environmental equity aspects
4.1 Perspectives on property rights
Part of the rationale for an environmental levy is based on a need to more equitably share the costs of 
agri-environmental  conservation  between  landholders  and  the  general  community  (so  called 
‘environmental equity’). NFF (2001) summarise the issue from their perspective in the following way. 
Environmental protection and biodiversity conservation is a shared responsibility of all Australians 
– however Commonwealth and State legislation imposes much of the cost of conservation directly on 
farmers. Farmers’ property rights are often reduced or impaired to achieve a community benefit, at 
not cost to the wider community. Farmers should not be expected to foot the total bill for public good 
outcomes which benefit the broader community (NFF 2001).
This issue is directly concerned with the nature of agricultural property rights. The changing nature of 
property rights has been a source of conflict in recent times. The nature of changes was explored in 
the course of the recent House of Representatives Standing Committee Inquiry into the effects of 
public good conservation measures.  
Over the past two decades, the laws governing land use in all jurisdictions have changed markedly. 
Practices formerly encouraged, subsidised and often made a condition of becoming a landholder are 
now prohibited…many landholders consider that the practices, that they were permitted or required 
to  do  when  taking  up  the  management  of  land  conferred  upon  them  rights  to  act  in  certain 
ways…that they constitute a type of property right.
Contemporary debate in Australia about property rights has featured terms like ‘cost sharing’, ‘a duty 
of  care  for  the  environment’  and  ‘ecosystem  services’.  The  meanings  of  each  of  these  terms  is 
explored below.
Cost sharing
Cost  sharing,  or  investment  sharing
9,  is  increasingly  being  found  in  State  and  Commonwealth 
environmental policies. Part of this focus is explained by increasing recognition of the public and 
private outcomes from conservation activities, combined with limited government budgets to address 
environmental problems. Investment sharing arrangements are a way in which landholders can be 
encouraged to provide public goods, which they may have little incentive to provide in the absence of 
such arrangements. 
Recent development of these principles can be found in Murray-Darling Basin Commission (1996) 
and  SCARM  (1998).  Marshall  (1998)  reviews  the  consistency  of  cost  sharing  principles  with 
economic efficiency, whilst the Productivity Commission (2001) looks at economic issues associated 
with applying cost sharing to bio-diversity conservation. Cost sharing is relevant to discussions about 
property  rights  because  any  agreed  sharing  implicitly  makes  judgements  about  rights  and 
responsibilities in environmental management.
Cost sharing often makes reference to two key principles, the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and the 
Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP). Under the PPP, landholders who cause degradation of land and 
water resources pay to alleviate and manage the problem in proportion to their contribution to the cost 
                                                
9 (SCARM 1998) refer to cost sharing as investment sharing  because it gives greater  recognition of contributions to 
resource management beyond financial costs and broadens the focus to activities that cannot be appropriately thought of as 
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of  the  problem  (MDBC,  1996).  SCARM  (1998)  notes  that  ‘where  polluters  or  impactors  can  be 
identified, the full cost of the impact prevention and control attributable to them, including the cost of 
required activities, should be born by them’. 
The PPP is broadly consistent with economic efficiency in that polluters are forced to incorporate the 
costs  of  any  environmentally  degrading  practice  (externality)  into  their  decisions.  There  is  some 
support for the PPP based on the concept of ‘equity’ or 'fairness'. The PPP can be considered an 
equitable approach  in that those who benefit from environmental degradation are required to bear the 
social  costs  of  their  actions  (Productivity  Commission,  2001).  A  particular  problem  with  the 
application  of  the  PPP  is  the  existence  of  degradation  rising  from  past  activities.  This  is  raised 
particularly as an issue in the context of Australian agriculture in that some degradation problems can 
be related to policy settings. It is difficult to mount an argument either on efficiency or equity grounds 
to  support  use  of  the PPP  to  past  practices. Generally these  would  be  treated as  sunk  costs  and 
therefore irrelevant for future planning.
The Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP) on the other hand implies that anyone who derives an indirect 
or intangible benefit (eg enhancement of bio-diversity or aesthetics) from an activity should contribute 
to its cost. Governments have generally supported a slightly different version of the BPP by including 
a sufficiency condition. This essentially involves assessing whether or not there could be sufficient 
private benefits to make the investment worthwhile from the landholders perspective. Governments 
need only invest an amount which is sufficient to trigger private investment. This is consistent with 
Hussey's (1996) assertions that public benefits should free ride on private benefits to the greatest 
extent possible.
Whilst cost sharing arrangements have been developed between landholders and governments over 
agri-environmental conservation works in some instances, the approach suffers from the problems of 
asymmetric information. This problem makes negotiations difficult because both parties have hidden 
information. Landholders have information on the marginal costs of conservation measures whilst 
governments  have  information  on  the  marginal  benefits  from  environmental  improvements. 
Asymmetric  information  limits  the  potential  for  efficient  markets  because  it  is  hazardous  to  do 
business with someone who has relevant but hidden information (Bardsley, Chaudri and Stoneham 
2001).
Duty of care
A duty of care
10 for the environment has been widely supported across industry and government (see 
Industry Commission 1998, SCARM 1998, National Farmers Federation 2001) and has been recently 
introduced into legislation in four States. Arguments put forward in support of an environmental duty 
of  care  include  its  potential  to  cover  gaps  in  existing  specific  environmental  legislation,  the 
simplification  and  integration  of  existing  environmental  protection  legislation  and  its  focus  on 
environmental performance rather than prescription (assuming that voluntary standards and codes are 
developed under the duty of care framework). Acceptance of a duty of care from a policy perspective 
can be found in SCARM (1998) which concluded that:
all  natural  resource  users  and  managers  have  a  duty  of  care  to  take  all  fair  and  reasonable 
measures to ensure that they do not damage the natural resource base (and that) users should be 
responsible for making good any damages incurred as a result of their actions. 
                                                
10 A duty of care for the environment extends common law in that common law does not recognise that any duty of care 
may be afforded to the environment per se. The common law can only protect the environment to the extent that legal 
liabilities for impacts on persons or property arise from some environmental harm (Bates, 2001).Agri-environmental conservation – the case for an environmental levy 12
Defining damage as well as linkages to action and where the duty of care lies are central to any 
discussion of payments for agri-environmental conservation. The duty of care marks the threshold 
point at which landholders may be required to meet environmental responsibilities and beyond which 
they could be deemed as providing some form of public conservation. While this has merit it is not 
clear how governments and landholders could use the concept in a meaningful way to negotiate the 
funding of agri-environmental conservation. It would appear to have information asymmetry problems 
similar to those discussed above. 
Ecosystem services
The concept of ecosystem services recognises the valuable role that ecosystems can play in providing 
essential goods and services. A key question  is who holds the rights  over ecosystem services.  If 
landholders have the right to use their property according to their own interests and withhold such 
services, than the public will need to compensate landholders for their provision. If the public holds 
the rights, than the public is entitled to ecosystem services and landholders will need to compensate 
the public if they are not supplied. 
4.2 Implications for public funding of agri-environmental conservation
The concept of supplying ecosystem services relates closely to cost sharing principles (ie. PPP and 
BPP) and a duty of care for the environment. We can call it different things, but essentially in each of 
these instances we are talking about rights and responsibilities in environmental management. With 
the extreme range of views on this area, progress in exactly specifying the nature of rights will be 
extremely difficult
11. On the one hand, there are compelling arguments which challenge the legitimacy 
of absolutist views of agricultural property rights including the:
 limitation of presumed property rights in actual law;
 right of the state to regulate land use activities in the public interest; and a
 dynamic nature of rights and the need for flexibility in such rights so that the state can meet the 
aspirations of its citizens as technology and values change (Colby 1995).
An alternative view would highlight the:
 need for secure rights to underpin economic development;
 historical involvement of governments in promoting agricultural development; and
 problems of fiscal illusion
12 if a state can reduce rights
In broad terms, the case for the public funding of agri-environmental conservation will be the subject 
of  on-going  debate  because  agri-environmental  conservation  activities  have  different  aspects  of 
private and public benefits requiring some value judgements about the level and appropriateness of 
public funding. 
                                                
11 Reeve (2002) reviews the nature of agricultural property rights and proposes a structural adjustment framework as a way 
of entering into a more productive dialogue over rural environmental issues relative to current concepts. He cites a number 
of advantages of such an approach including that it would provide a conduit for public investment in the conservation of 
resources, has the desirable features of administrative flexibility and avoids establishing compensation precedents.
12  In  the  absence  of  a  requirement  for  government  to  pay  compensation  for  regulation,  it  has  been  argued  that  the 
opportunity costs of existing land uses will be ignored. As a consequence, land use regulations, unburdened by the need to 
pay compensation, will lead to the over supply of environmental goods. In these cases, government is said to have ‘fiscal 
illusion’ in that it only compares the benefit of the public good with the zero cost of compensation.Agri-environmental conservation – the case for an environmental levy 13
In general terms, there is a weak case for the expenditure of public funds on environmental issues that 
have few spillovers to other farmers or the community more generally. Problems of soil acidity and 
sodicity largely fall into  this category because they primarily remain on site. On the other hand, 
resources  which  have  the  characteristics  of  non-excludability  and  non-rivalry  (like  biodiversity) 
present a better case for the expenditure of public funds.  
In considering the amount of public funding to be provided, there should be a focus on the minimum 
level of incentive required by landholders to facilitate the desired change. Given the problems of 
asymmetric information referred to above, consideration needs to be given to how to efficiently reveal 
this  information.  There  are  large  transaction  costs  and  possible  inefficiencies  in  applying  either 
standard or negotiated cost sharing ratios for particular conservation activities. There would appear to 
be  compelling  reasons  for  involving  competitive  market  processes  in  determining  the  level  and 
allocation of public funds. 
5. Is a levy the right instrument?
5.1 Budget process
In considering whether an environmental levy is an appropriate response to environmental problems, 
it is sensible to firstly question why environmental spending cannot be funded through normal budget 
processes. It would seem  reasonable to assume that the environment is an increasing priority for 
governments  and  that  accordingly  it  should  be  able  to  compete  with  other  portfolios  in  the 
prioritisation of scarce funds. ‘The conservation budget should not be quarantined from the scrutiny 
that applies in other areas in the process of bringing expenditures and available resources into balance’ 
(Edwards and Bryon 2001). From an economy wide view it is important that the potential uses of 
funds compete with each other so that the best allocation of public resources is achieved.
However it is apparent that special levies are growing in popularity. Some recent examples include:
 The firearms buy back scheme – funded by an increase in the Medicare Levy in 1996-97 from 1.5 
to 1.7%. The compensation cost from the scheme was $398 million and administration cost of $63 
million.
 Dairy  industry  adjustment  levy  –  to  assist  the  dairy  industry  cope  with  deregulation,  the 
government has imposed a 11 cents per litre levy on retail sales of liquid milk (as of July 2000). 
 Ansett levy – in 2001 a levy was imposed on air tickets to fund employee entitlements from the 
former Ansett group of employees.
Whilst there has been one additional income tax levy put in place (the gun buy back levy), all other 
levies have been imposed directly on industries. The proposed and approved income tax based levies 
have also arisen in the context of an unforseen event (eg. the Port Arthur tragedy in the context of the 
buy  back  levy  and  social/political  turmoil  in  the  case  of  East  Timor  levy).  Concerns  about  the 
environment don’t fall neatly into a category of ‘unexpected events’ 
Governments could raise/encourage private expenditure on the environment through:
 An additional income tax levy 
 Sale of public assets (eg. Telstra)
 Income taxation concessions – this represents a reduction in taxation revenue to the government 
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 Other taxation concessions (capital gains tax, land tax etc)
 Environmental taxation – this could include Pigouvian taxes that are proportional to environmental 
pollution, fixed charges, usage prices.
5.2 Criteria
In examining the merits of an environmental levy, the following issues require consideration:
Efficiency
Depends on the way in which resources are allocated to environmental issues. High pay-offs to the 
community will require investment in areas of market failure and efficient ways for government to 
intervene.  There  is  also  potential  to  spend  it  extremely  poorly  particularly  if  the  severity  of 
degradation is used as a key criterion as appears to be the case with the recommendations with 
Virtual Consulting et al (2000). 
Incentives
The levy has been  proposed  principally as a revenue  raising activity rather than an incentive  to 
change behaviour. Consequently, it may not affect incentives although it is possible that it could 
detract from levels of existing voluntary expenditure on the environment.
Relationship to existing arrangements
It  is  not  clear  how  the  proceeds  of  the  levy  would  be  allocated  across  existing 
jurisdictions/environmental  issues.  The  Wentworth  Group  (2002)  propose  to  establish  a  National 
Commission  to  set  priorities,  establish  national  targets  and  standards,  accredit  regional  plans, 
recommend  the  funding  of  investment  priorities  etc.  The  efficiency  of  this  approach  relative  to 
existing arrangements requires closer examination. 
Accountability
Depending upon institutional arrangements for the levy, there may be some accountability benefits to 
the wider community in clearly knowing the extent of environmental expenditure. 
Administration costs
The marginal costs of levy collection are likely to be small given existing arrangements for Medicare 
Levy. 
Equity
An environmental levy may adversely affect low income groups if it is applied across the board 
without the establishment of income thresholds.
6. Conclusion
The need for a special purpose levy is based on an assessment that such a significant increase in the 
funding of environmental issues is outside the scope of existing government budgets and beyond the 
level of agri-environmental conservation which could reasonably be expected of landholders. It has 
been proposed largely on the extent and costs of degradation and the need to better balance the burden 
of agri-environmental conservation.
Whilst degradation may be related to a source of market failure, the sheer existence of any level of 
degradation does not necessarily imply that market failure exists. Most commentaries, and indeed 
much  of  the  argument  for  increased  public  funding  of  environmental  issues,  is  based  on  the 
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intervention. Neither the area of resource degradation nor the estimated costs of that degradation 
provide  guidance  on  whether  the  problem  can  be  efficiently  addressed.  It  has  to  be  shown  that 
government can do better.
In  evaluating  whether  additional  environmental  expenditure  is  warranted,  both  scientists  and 
economists need to undertake analyses using appropriate methods, accurate data and in a fashion 
unencumbered by good intentions. ‘The worthiness of the cause offers no guarantee against wasteful 
allocation of resources to it’ (Edwards and Bryon 2001). Assessing the efficiency of increasing public 
funding  of  environmental  issues  requires  a  forward  rather  than  a  backward  looking  approach. 
Research into the marginal social benefits from addressing particular degradation problems relative to 
their marginal social costs should be a key priority. 
There are a number of challenges for the efficient investment of public funds in agri-environmental 
conservation including uncertainty, institutional arrangements and the potential for perverse outcomes. 
Combining  these  with  anecdotal  information  on  the  previous  poor  returns  from  environmental 
expenditure raises real issues about the ability of governments to efficiently spend large sums of 
money as envisaged.   
The second major reason for increasing public funding of agri-environmental conservation relates to 
environmental  equity.  The  argument  for  environmental  equity strikes  at  the  heart  of  the  ongoing 
debate about the nature of property rights. Different terms have been used to describe property rights 
(cost sharing, duty of care, environmental services) but it remains as intractable as ever. In considering 
the  amount  of  public  funding to  be  provided,  there  should  be  a  focus  on  the  minimum  level of 
incentive required by landholders to facilitate the desired change. Given the problems of asymmetric 
information inherent in any discussion of cost sharing between governments and farmers, there may 
be  an  important  role  for  involving  competitive  market  processes  in  determining  the  level  and 
allocation of public funds to agri-environmental conservation.
Finally, the paper raises a number of issues to consider whether an environmental levy is the most 
appropriate instrument in raising funds for increased public funding of environmental issues. A key 
issue  for  further  work  is  the  expanding  role  that  more  voluntary  approaches  to  environmental 
management may play in the future (environmental management systems, eco-labelling and green 
accounting in the corporate sector).Agri-environmental conservation – the case for an environmental levy 16
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